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ABSTRACT 
 
EGOCENTRISM AND VIOLENCE: 
A CRITIQUE OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY 
 
Avşar, Şervan Adar 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Dr. Tore Fougner 
 
September 2004 
 
The main argument of this thesis is that democratic peace theory is violent at both the 
theoretical and practical level. This argument is developed by drawing on the ideas 
of French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas on egocentrism and violence. The 
advocates of democratic peace theory argue that democracies are peaceful in their 
relations with other democracies, whereas they are not peaceful in their relations with 
the states having any other type of regime. Therefore, democratic peace theorists 
claim that the spread of democracy is the basis of world peace. These central themes 
of democratic peace theory contain implicit egocentric and violent tendencies. First 
of all, democratic peace theory represents the primacy of the same by making 
democratic political system an ideal for all states. This is because there exists in 
democratic peace theory a fundamental narcissism of ego, which takes itself to be the 
centre of all meaning. Secondly, democratic peace theory is violent since it tries to 
 iv 
comprehend the other through thematization and conceptualisation. In other words, 
through the spread of democracy it reduces the other to the same. 
 
Keywords: Democratic peace theory, egocentrism, violence, the other, ethics, 
Emmanuel Levinas 
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ÖZET 
 
BENMERKEZCİLİK VE ŞİDDET 
BİR DEMOKRATİK BARIŞ TEORİSİ ELEŞTİRİSİ 
 
Avşar, Şervan Adar 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Tore Fougner 
 
Eylül 2004 
 
 Bu tezin amacı Fransız filozof Emmanuel Levinas’ın benmerkezcilik ve şiddet 
üzerine düşüncelerini temel alarak demokratik barış teorisinin hem teorik hem de 
pratik bağlamda şiddet içerdiğini göstermektir. Demokratik barış teorisinin 
savunucularına göre demokratik devletler kendi aralarındaki ilişkikilerinde barışçıl 
olsalar da diğer tür rejimlere sahip devletlerle ilişkileri aynı şekilde barışçıl değildir. 
Bundan dolayı bu teorinin savunucuları demokrasinin yaygınlaştırılmasını dünya 
barışı için temel olarak görürler. Demokratik barış teorisinin bu saydığımız temel 
argümanları açık olmayan benmerkezci ve şiddet temelli eğilimler içerir. Öncelikle, 
demokratik barış teorisi demokratik yönetim biçimini herkes için bir ideal olarak 
sunması yoluyla ‘aynı’nın (the same) üstünlüğünü temsil eder. Çünkü demokratik 
barş teorisinde kendini bütün anlamın merkezine yerleştiren ego’nun narsizmi söz 
konusudur. İkinci olarak, demokratik barış teorisi ötekini tematize etme ve 
 vi 
kavramlaştırma yoluyla indirgemeye çalıştığından dolayı şiddet içerir. Diğer deyişle, 
demokrasinin yaygınlaştırılmasıyla ötekini aynıya indirgemiş olur. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokratik barış teorisi, benmerkezcilik, şiddet, öteki, etik, 
Emmanuel Levinas 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Drawing on the ideas of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas on egocentrism and 
violence, the main argument of this thesis is that democratic peace theory is violent at 
both the theoretical and practical level. In making and defending this argument, the 
thesis provides an original critique of democratic peace theory based on its egocentric 
and violent tendencies. 
 
As a discipline that emerged after the First World War, International Relations 
has focused on the causes and nature of wars and developed its own understanding 
through different theories. One of them was the liberal internationalist theory of 
democratic peace which “has steadily gained ground, and has obtained reasonable 
acceptance among Western scholars and especially within American academia” 
(Nikolaos, 2003: 1) since the beginning of the 1980s. The popularity of democratic 
peace theory went so far in policy circles and within academia that scholar like Jack S. 
Levy argued that democratic peace theory turned into “an empirical law in international 
relations” (1989: 88). 
 
The advocates of democratic peace theory argue that democracies are peaceful in 
their relations with other democracies, whereas they are not peaceful in their relations 
with the states having any other type of regime. Therefore, democratic peace theorists 
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claim that the spread of democracy is the basis of world peace. These central themes of 
democratic peace theory contain implicit egocentric and violent tendencies. 
 
Levinas argues that Western philosophy has been an ontology characterised by 
the reduction of the other to the same. Therefore, Levinas names Western philosophy as 
an egology which asserts the primacy of the same and the suppression of the other. 
Being rooted in this philosophical tradition, democratic peace theory represents the 
egocentrism (the primacy of the same), and violence and power involved in ontology as 
first philosophy.  
 
First of all, democratic peace theory represents the primacy of the same by 
making its political system an ideal for everybody. This is because there exists in 
democratic peace theory a fundamental narcissism of ego, which takes itself to be the 
centre of all meaning. Secondly, democratic peace theory is violent since it tries to 
comprehend the other through thematization and conceptualisation. Through the spread 
of democracy, it reduces the other to the same. In other words, the West reduces the 
other states to itself through the spread of democracy and comprehends by calling the 
other state as “non-democratic”.   
 
In developing this alternative critique of democratic peace theory, the thesis has 
been structured under three chapters. The first chapter deals with democratic peace 
theory and its critics. By outlining the arguments of prominent democratic peace 
theorists and their critics, this chapter serves as form of literature review.  
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The second chapter deals with the thought of Emmanuel Levinas on egocentrism, 
violence and ethics. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary 
philosophical basis to be able to criticise democratic peace as being egocentric and 
violent. This chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which introduces Levinas’s 
thought by discussing his critiques of Western philosophy. The second section deals 
with the self’s relation to the other, and how the emergence of the other disrupts the 
egocentrism. The third section deals with different forms of violence with reference to 
both Levinas and Johan Galtung. Finally, the fourth section discusses the ethical in the 
thought of Levinas. 
 
 The third chapter is the analysis chapter and it attempts to show how democratic 
peace is violent in itself although it argues for the world peace through the spread of 
democracy. The chapter deals with the issue of violence at both the theoretical and 
practical level. After explaining how the West identifies itself with democracy, the 
chapter deals with violence inside the democratic peace theory under the subtitle 
“Comprehension” and violence in the acts derived from democratic peace theory under 
the subtitle “Murder”.  
 
In the conclusion, I provide an overview of the arguments made in the third 
chapter. Additionally, I attempt to open up the thesis by indicating a new way for 
international politics based on ethical peace. 
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CHAPTER 1 
DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY AND ITS CRITICS 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is, first of all, to provide an account of democratic peace 
theory by drawing on the arguments of prominent democratic peace theorists. Secondly, 
the chapter will provide an overview of important critiques of the theory. The first part 
of the chapter deals with democratic peace theory and the explanatory variables used 
within the democratic peace theory to explain the absence of war between democracies. 
The second part of the chapter deals with both realist and non-realist critiques of 
democratic peace theory.  
 
 
1.1 Democratic Peace Theory 
 
Democratic peace theory regards the spread of democracy as the basis of world peace, 
and claims that democratic states are more peaceful than states having any other type of 
political regime. In other words, “the more democratic each state is, the more peaceful 
their relations are likely to be” (Bruce Russett et al., 1993: 314). However, democratic 
peace theory does not argue that democratic states are less war-prone than non-
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democratic states. Instead, the theory suggests that democracies do not go to war with 
other democracies. Advocates of democratic peace theory argue that “rarely, if ever, 
have liberal democracies fought each other” (Nikolaos, 2003: 2). This is a remarkable 
finding according to them, and it “diminishes the authority of realism as the dominant 
theory of international relations” (Nikolaos, 2003: 2). 
 
The basic tenets of democratic peace theory can be outlined as follows: 
 
a- Democratically organized political systems in general operate 
under restraints that make them more peaceful in their relations 
with other democracies. 
b- Democracies are not necessarily peaceful, however, in their 
relations with other kinds of political systems. 
c- In the modern international system, democracies are less likely to 
use lethal violence toward other democracies than toward 
autocratically governed states are toward each other. 
d- The relationship of relative peace among democracies is 
importantly a result of some features of democracy, rather than 
being caused exclusively by economic or geopolitical 
characteristics correlated with democracy (Russett, 1993: 11). 
 
The statement that, in the modern international system, democracies have never fought 
each other represents a complex phenomenon for Russett (1993:4):  
 
(a) Democracies rarely fight each other (an empirical statement) 
because (b) they have other means of resolving conflicts between 
them and therefore do not need to fight each other (a prudential 
statement), and (c) they perceive that democracies should not fight 
each other (a normative statement about principles of right 
behaviour), which reinforces the empirical statement. 
 
 
Democratic peace theory draws on the ideas of Immanuel Kant. For him, “the moral 
element that helps the framework for peaceful relations between democratic states is 
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based on the common principles of cooperation, mutual respect and understanding” 
(cited in Özkeçeci, 2002: 1). The Kantian basis of democratic peace theory can be found 
in Kant’s Perpetual Peace. Kant’s concept of international right requires ”the 
abolishment of war and the salvation of humanity from its vast graveyard” (cited in 
Nikolaus: 4).  
 
According to Nikolaus (4), Kant’s position can be summed up in the form of 
three principles of international right for “the development of a state of perpetual peace 
between all the nations of the world.” The first principle is that states should not 
interfere in the internal affairs of any state. Furthermore, every state should be 
republican since republican states need the consent if their citizens to wage war 
(Nikolaus: 4). Secondly, for Kant, independent states should form a federation “where 
the rights and the sovereignty of every individual member will be secured” (cited in 
Nikolaus: 5). This federation is called pacific federation. The third principle is the 
principle of hospitality according to which strangers should not be treated with enmity 
(Nikolaus: 5). 
 
It was Michael Doyle who introduced these ideas of Kant to the International 
Relations literature. In his 1983 article “Kant, Liberal legacies, and Foreign Affairs”, 
Doyle challenges the dominant realist view of international politics by demonstrating 
that regimes and institutions do make a difference in foreign affairs. According to 
Doyle’s historical assessment of the wars of the last two hundred years, there has not 
been a conflict between democracies until our epoch.  
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 The theoretical foundations of democratic peace can be divided into two: 
monadic and dyadic propositions. According to the monadic proposition, “the more 
democratic the state, the less violent its behaviour towards all other states, including 
both democracies and non-democracies” (Özkeçeci, 2002: 1). The dyadic proposition on 
the other hand, suggests that “the regime type of the opponent will crucially affect war 
decision and democratic states can be war-prone when facing non-democratic 
counterparts” (Özkeçeci, 2002: 2). 
 
However, the similarity of form of government in general is not enough to 
explain the absence of war between democracies. If it was enough, then “we would 
expect to have seen peace between the Soviet Union and China" etc. (Russett et.al., 
2004: 316).  Thus, some scholars have pointed to other influences that are correlated 
with democracy. Scholars like Maoz and Russett have suggested that “the absence of 
conflict between democratic states could be due to factors other than shared 
democraticness” (cited in Siverson, 1995: 481). Layne (1994: 8) also sees the 
identification of the special characteristics of the democratic states that refrain them 
from going to war with other democracies as the key challenge. In other words, different 
explanatory variables within the theory have emerged. These can be summed up in two 
main categories: those that emphasise the structural constraints imposed on policy-
makers in liberal democratic regimes, and those that argue that shared norms among 
liberal democracies are the key (Grayson, 2003: 3).  
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1.1.1 Explanations Based on Norms and Culture 
 
It is generally argued that democracies are inherently more peaceful because of the 
political culture favouring the peaceful resolution of disputes. In democratic states, 
“resort to organized lethal violence, or the threat of it, is considered illegitimate and 
unnecessary to secure one’s ‘legitimate’ rights” (Russett, 1993: 31). These two 
statements represent one way of explaining the absence of conflict or war between 
democracies within the democratic peace theory drawing on norms and culture: The 
former referring to culture, and the latter referring to norms.  
 
One of the important determinants of the pacific behaviour of democratic states 
is perception and the practises led by these perceptions that provide the peaceful 
resolution of the conflicts without using force or the threat of using force. This is 
because, 
 
if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-
governing people who share norms of live-and-let-live, they will 
respect the rights of others to self-determination if those others are 
also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into 
aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite (Russett, 1993: 31).  
 
Therefore, one can say that “democratic states develop positive perceptions of other 
democracies” (Layne, 1994: 9), and their relations are based on mutual respect. These 
perceptions are facilitated by “the openness of society” and “the free flow of 
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information”, both of which are considered to be characteristics of democracy (Russett 
et al., 2004:  315).  
 
Defenders of democratic peace theory argue, at the same time, that these 
restraints do not apply to non-democratic states or the states having any other type of 
regime. Because the leaders of non-democratic states have been regarded as “being in a 
permanent state of aggression against their own people, and thus also against foreigners” 
by the democratic peace theorists and policy makers. For Russett: 
 
According to democratic norms, authoritarian states do not rest on 
the proper consent of the governed, and thus they cannot properly 
represent the will of their peoples… Rulers who control their own 
people by such means, who do not behave in a just way that respects 
their own people’s rights to self-determination, cannot be expected 
to behave better toward peoples outside their states…By this 
reasoning, democracies must be eternally vigilant and may even 
need to engage in defensively motivated war or pre-emptive action 
anticipating an immediate attack (1993: 32).  
 
In a general perspective, John M. Owen (1994: 88) argues that “liberal ideas 
cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another, and that the same 
ideas prod these states into war with illiberal ones.” He adds: 
 
liberal democracies are those states with a visible liberal presence, 
and that feature free speech and regular competitive elections of the 
officials empowered to declare war... liberal ideology and 
institutions work in tandem to bring about democratic peace. 
Liberals believe that individuals everywhere are fundamentally the 
same, and are best off pursuing self-preservation and material well-
being .... Liberals believe that democracies seek their citizens’ true 
interests and that thus by definition they are pacific and trustworthy. 
Non-democracies may be dangerous because they seek other ends, 
such as conquest or plunder. (1994: 89).  
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To summarise these explanations based on norms and culture and their restraints on 
violent conflict among democracies, let us refer to Russett’s analysis on 
normative/cultural model. He summarises this model as follows (1993: 35): 
 
1. In relations with other states, decisionmakers (whether they be 
few or many) will try to follow the same norms of conflict 
resolution as have been developed within and characterize their 
domestic political processes. 
2. They will expect decisionmakers in other states likewise to 
follow the same norms of conflict resolution as have been 
developed within and characterize those other states' domestic 
political processes. 
 
A. Violent conflicts between democracies will be rare because: 
 
3. In democracies, the relevant decisionmakers expect to be able to 
resolve conflicts by compromise and nonviolence, respecting the 
rights and continued existence of opponents. 
4. Therefore democracies will follow norms of peaceful conflict 
resolution with other democracies, and will expect other 
democracies to do so with them. 
5. The more stable the democracy, the more will democratic norms 
govern its behavior with other democracies, and the more will 
other democracies expect democratic norms to govern its 
international behavior. 
6. If violent conflicts between democracies do occur, at least one 
of the democracies is likely to be politically unstable. 
 
B. Violent conflicts between nondemocracies, and between democ-
racies and nondemocracies, will be more frequent because: 
 
7. In nondemocracies, decisionmakers use, and may expect their 
opponents to use, violence and the threat of violence to resolve 
conflict as part of their domestic political processes. 
8. Therefore nondemocracies may use violence and the threat of 
violence in conflicts with other states, and other states may 
expect them to use violence and the threat of violence in such 
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conflicts. 
9. Democratic norms can be more easily exploited to force 
concessions that can    nondemocratic ones; to avoid exploitation 
democracies may adopt nondemocratic norms in dealing with 
nondemocracies. 
 
 
 
1.2. Institutional Constraints or Structural Explanations 
 
According to Russett (1993: 38), “democracies are constrained in going to war by the 
need to ensure broad popular support, manifested in various institutions of government”. 
The structural explanation of democratic peace basically argues that institutional 
constraints in a democracy like elections, division of powers and checks and balances 
limit the autonomy and discretion of leaders to launch war. 'Checks and balances' is one 
of the most important of these institutional constraints, for they constitute an important 
characteristic of liberal democracies. Even 200 years ago, Immanuel Kant argued that  
 
checks and balances in government would act as a brake on the use 
of military force- as compared to autocratic governments where a 
single individual (or a small ruling group) could make war without 
regard for the effect on population (cited in Goldstein, 2004: 176). 
 
As Layne (1994: 9) puts it, "states with executives answerable to a selection body,... 
with decision making responsibility spread among multiple institutions or individuals 
should be more highly constrained and henceless likely to go to war." 
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Another point is that leaders must mobilize public support in order to wage a 
war. The process of mobilization “requires time as leaders of various institutions are 
convinced and formal approval is obtained” (Russett et al., 2004: 316). Moreover, such 
delays allow the parties to engage in negotiation and other types of peaceful conflict 
resolution. 
 
Democracies have reciprocal cooperative behaviour that makes them “accept 
third party mediations, or good offices in settling disputes, and generally to resolve 
conflicts peacefully" (Russett et al., 2004: 314). Therefore, one can argue that if leaders 
of democratic states consider other democracies to be slow to go to war because of 
similar institutional constraints, then they will not fear any attack from another 
democracy. One should also take into account that "if the price the conflict is high, 
democratic governments may fall victim to electoral retribution" (Layne, 1994: 9).  
 
To summarise these explanations based on institutional constraints and their 
restraints on violent conflict among democracies, let us refer to Russett’s analysis on the 
structural/institutional model. He summarises this model as follows (1993:40): 
 
  A. Violent conflicts between democracies will be infrequent because: 
 
1. In democracies, the constraints of checks and balances, division of 
power, and need for public debate to enlist widespread support will 
slow decisions to use large-scale violence and reduce the likelihood 
that such decisions will be made. 
2. Leaders of other states will perceive leaders of democracies as so 
constrained. 
3. Thus leaders of democracies will expect, in conflicts with other 
democracies, time for processes of international conflict resolution 
 13
to operate, and they will not fear surprise attack. 
 
B. Violent conflicts between nondemocracies, and between democ-
racies and nondemocracies, will be frequent because: 
 
4. Leaders of nondemocracies are not constrained as leaders of 
democracies are, so they can more easily, rapidly, and secretly initiate 
large-scale violence. 
5. Leaders of states (democracies and nondemocracies) in conflict 
with nondemocracies may initiate violence rather than risk surprise 
attack. 
6. Perceiving that leaders of democracies will be constrained, leaders 
of nondemocracies may press democracies to make greater 
concessions over issues in conflict. 
7.Democracies may initiate large-scale violence with non-
democracies rather than make the greater concessions demanded. 
 
 
 
2.2 Critiques of Democratic Peace Theory 
 
In spite of its popularity, the democratic peace theory has not been left unchallenged. 
The main criticisms of the democratic peace theory have realist origins, since it 
challenges the influence of realism in International Relations. Thus, let us first look at 
realist critiques of democratic peace theory. 
 
Realists argue that states are rational actors and try to maximize their national 
interest. Therefore, domestic factors like regime type are irrelevant and do not affect 
foreign policy decisions of states. In consequence, relations between democratic 
countries will not be different than the relations between non-democratic states. Another 
common criticism is that of realists arguing that the definition of democracy is not clear, 
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and that different definitions are used by state leaders for the sake of strategic 
considerations. 
 
Realists claim that when power politics requires war with a 
democracy, liberals will redefine that state as a despotism; when 
power politics requires peace with a non-democracy, they will 
redefine that state as a democracy. That is, ideological labels are 
sugar-coating to make otherwise bitter policies easier to swallow 
(Owen, 1994: 120).  
 
Also Layne’s (1994:12) claim that “neither institutional constraints nor domestic 
political structure can explain democratic peace” can be considered under realist 
critiques. For him, if public opinion really has an effect, then democratic states will have 
peaceful relations with all states. He introduces the concept of "near misses" for his 
critique of democratic peace theory. According to Layne (1994: 13), “democratic peace 
theory, if valid, should account powerfully for the fact that serious crises between 
democratic states ended in near misses rather than in war.” But based on his historical 
case studies of ‘the United States and Great Britain in 1861’, ‘the United States and 
Great Britain in 1895-96’ (the Venezuela crisis), ‘France and Great Britain in 1898’ (the 
Fashoda crisis), and ‘France and Germany in 1923’ (the Ruhr crisis) he argues that 
realism provides a "more compelling explanation" for the avoidance of war than 
democratic peace theory. In each crises, he claims that "war was not avoided because of 
the 'live and let-live' spirit of peaceful dispute resolution of democratic peace theory, but 
because of realist factors" such as "vital strategic" and "reputational interests" (Layne, 
1994: 38). 
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Given how theorists of democratic peace generally employ statistical data to 
prove their claims about the absence of war among democracies, some of the important 
critiques of democratic peace theory concentrate on the statistical data. A case in point is 
Christopher Layne who argues that between 1815 and 1945 there were very few 
democracies in the world and, therefore the possibilities of a war involving democracies 
were negligible. He also adds that war is a relatively rare occurrence, and the fact that 
democracies rarely engage in war with each other may be the product of random chance. 
In this respect, David Spiro also argues that  
 
the number of wars between democracies is not statistically different 
from what random chance would predict. Both wars and 
democracies are rare, and that is why there are not many wars 
between democracies (in Russett et al., 1995: 177).    
 
Therefore, Spiro concludes that “the absence of war between democracies is statistically 
insignificant” (in Russett et al., 1995:178). 
 
Another criticism comes from Nikolaos, who argues that democratic peace 
theory is a tool for analysing and justifying the foreign policy actions of Western states 
in general and the United States in particular. To make this argument clear, he refers to 
some of statements of the important decision-making figures: 
 
Woodrow Wilson: “The war against Germany was to make the 
world safe for democracy”. 
 
National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake: “America’s post-Cold 
War foreign policy should aim at expanding the zone of democratic 
peace because to the extent democracy and market economies hold 
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sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, 
prosperous and influential” (2003: 2-3). 
  
 
Realists are not the only scholars criticising democratic peace theory. Thus, the rest of 
this section will deal with two different critiques of democratic peace theory introduced 
by Johan Galtung and Kyle Grayson. 
 
 Johan Galtung presents a different critique of democratic peace theory through an 
exploration of the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy or, in his words, 
“democracy domestically, belligerence abroad” (1996: 49). He argues that “according to 
their self-image, democracies are not belligerent, engaging in war; and not even bellicist, 
inclined to resort to war. They are peace-loving, stressing the peaceful pursuit of their 
goal” (1996:49)1. For Galtung (1996:49), however, war activities have most often been 
masked by using other names, and he talks about two traditions in this connection: 
 
‘punitive expeditions’ (a British tradition for at least two centuries, 
participation in the Gulf War being only one in a long chain events); 
or ‘action to protect our citizens and economic interests abroad’ (a 
US tradition). 
 
As Galtung (1996:50) rightly puts it, “after World War II the countries most frequently 
engaging in war have been the USA, the UK, France and Israel; all of them democracies. 
Most countries in the ‘US-led coalition’ against Iraq in the Gulf War were democracies.”  
Based on his arguments, democracy can be considered “compatible with large-scale 
                                                 
1 In Galtung’s usage, belligerence means engagement in war and war-like acts, and bellicism means the 
general inclination to do so (the opposite of pacifism). 
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exercises of violence – bellicist, not only belligerent” (1996:50). As a result of his 
attempt to explain “democracy domestically, belligerence abroad”, he explores nine 
factors “as possible links between democracy as a way of doing domestic politics, and 
belligerence as a way of doing foreign policy” (1996:57). These nine factors are as 
follows (1996:57):  
 
1. Individualistic, competitive, aggressive culture. 
2. A history of inflicting traumas upon others. 
3. High position in the world pyramid. 
4. Isomorphism between domestic and world structure. 
5. Shared decision-making. 
6. Implementing human rights. 
7. Inner power struggle. 
8. Inner peace surplus. 
9. Self-righteousness being a democracy. 
 
For Grayson (1994: 3), “the nuances of democratic peace theory have been lost as it has 
become enmeshed with popular discourse in the West.” In consequence, the theory has 
been transformed into a number of assertions (Grayson, 1994: 3):  
 
1. democracies are inherently peaceful unless unjustly attacked (or 
threatened) by authoritarian regimes, 
 
2. use of force by democracies are justified because they are 
directed against real threat launched by rogue actors intent on 
undermining the ‘democratic way of life’, 
 
3. democracies by definition cannot go to war with one another (as 
a result of assertion 1), 
 
4. the best way to ensure global stability and peace is to promote 
the spread of democracy. 
 
Upon these assertions, Grayson provides us with a different critique of 
democratic peace theory: 
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The power of these assertions is augmented by the fact that they are 
very easy to comprehend and thus disseminate to the population at 
large; they muster support and help to provide a basis of legitimacy 
for actions (including large-scale use of violence) that may have 
otherwise generated internal apathy if not opposition (2003: 4). 
 
With reference to the arguments put forward by Roxanne Lynn Doty in her book 
Imperial Encounters, Grayson (2003: 4) argues for two important nodal points for 
democratic peace theory “around which to fix meaning and establish positions to make 
predication possible”2. These nodal points are “democracy” and “war.” Grayson  is 
critical of democracy for being an inherently American conception. In other words, “it 
does not reflect how democracy is practised in other states, and these differences in 
practice tend to be ignored in the literature unless the practice is considered ‘illiberal’” 
(Grayson, 2003: 4). With regard to the conception of war in democratic peace theory, it 
only recognises formal declarations of war and neglects attacks against ideology, 
religion, identity, and culture - as US interventions in Third World countries to 
overthrow the elected governments (Grayson, 2003: 5).   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 For Roxanne Lynn Doty, ‘the hegemonic dimension of global politics is inextricably linked to 
representational practices, as hegemonic practices are those which seek to create a fixedness of meaning 
(in identity) that ultimaltely is impossible’ (Grayson, 2003: 4). Doty divides practice of representation into 
seven crucial elements which help to produce and reproduce difference: nodal points, naturalisation, 
classification, surveillance, negation, positioning, and the logic of difference (4). For more detail see Doty 
(1996). 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE CRITIQUE: LEVINAS ON 
EGOCENTRISM, VIOLENCE AND ETHICS 
 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to develop the basis for an alternative critique of democratic 
peace theory with reference to Emmanuel Levinas’s ideas concerning the Same and the 
Other, egocentrism, violence and ethics. The first part of the chapter introduces 
Levinas’s critique of the Western philosophical tradition, which characterizes his 
philosophy. The second part of the chapter focuses on the Same and the Other and how 
the emergence of the other disrupts the egocentrism of the Western philosophical 
tradition. The third part of the chapter deals with forms of violence with reference to 
both Levinas and Johan Galtung. Finally, the fourth part of the chapter deals with the 
ethical in the thought of Levinas. 
 
2.1 Introduction: Narcissism of Western Thought 
 
Colin Davis (1996: 1) describes the thought of Emmanuel Levinas as being “governed 
by one simple yet far-reaching idea: Western philosophy has consistently practised a 
suppression of the Other.” The main criticism that Levinas directed to the history of 
Western thought was that the Other has been regarded as both separate from and 
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reconcilable with the Same. “What is same in all Western philosophy is the logic of 
sameness, namely the systematic enclosure of individuality within all-encompassing 
system” (Levene, 2004: 46). For Levinas, “the ontological event that defines and 
dominates the philosophical tradition from Parmenides to Heidegger consists in 
suppressing or reducing all forms of otherness by transmuting them into the same” 
(Critchley and Bernasconi, 2002:16). In Totality and Infinity, Levinas argues that 
 
A philosophy of power, ontology, as first philosophy, which does not 
question the Same, is a philosophy of injustice. …Heideggerian 
ontology which subordinates the relation to the other being to the 
relation to being in general, remains under obedience to the 
anonymous and leads fatally to another power, to imperialist 
domination, to tyranny (1998: 46). 
 
This is what we can call as the “Hegemony of the Same” in which “the idea of being is 
fundamentally adequate to and adjusted to the Same” (Peperzak et al., 1996: 12). In 
other words, “otherness or alterity appears as a temporary interruption to be eliminated 
as it is incorporated into or reduced to the sameness” (Davis, 1996: 3). In Totality and 
Infinity, Levinas explains this situation: 
 
Western philosophy has most often been an ontology3: a reduction of 
the Other to the same (or self) by interposition of a middle and 
neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being. Thus, 
philosophy is an egology, asserting the primacy of the self, the same, 
the subject or being. The Other is acknowledged only in order to be 
suppressed or possessed (1998: 43). 
 
                                                 
3 For Levinas, to theory as comprehension of beings the general title ontology is appropriate. Ontology 
which reduces the other to the same, promotes freedom – the freedom that is identification of the same, 
not allowing itself to be alienated by the other. 
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History of this Western philosophical tradition can be summarised in a passage from 
Colin Davis as he argues: 
 
The ontological imperialism of Western thought manifests itself in 
different forms, but the hidden purpose is always to find a means of 
offsetting the shock of alterity. The Platonic theory of knowledge as 
anamnesis (recollection) asserts that I already know what I seek to 
know, all knowledge is already contained within myself; Husserlian 
phenomenology, with its concepts of intentionality and 
representation, establishes the Ego as the source of all meaning and 
knowledge; the Heideggerian relation of beings to Being entails the 
exclusion of anything that might lie outside that relation. Thus, 
philosophy is an egology, asserting the primacy of the Same, the 
subject or Being (1996: 40).    
 
 
For Levinas, philosophy has been characterised by its failure to think of the other as 
Other. This is because “Western thought has been a philosophy of the Same and that its 
aspiration rests in a fundamental narcissism of an ego which takes itself to be the centre 
and the all” (Peperzak, 1993: 49).  In other words, in Western thought “the Same 
encompasses and envelops the Other; monism wins out over the pluralism of existent 
beings” (Peperzak, 1993: 53). 
 
 
2.2 On the Same and the Other: Disrupting Egocentrism 
 
What is there other than being? This question is central in two of Levinas’s books, 
Totaliy and Infinity and Otherwise Than Being. As Peperzak  argues in his commentary 
on Levinas:  
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If all knowledge presupposes the experience of something that can be 
neither given nor wholly integrated by consciousness as such, then 
there must be something other than Being … Instead of seeing all 
realities as unfolding or surrounding elements of one basic and 
central instance called “the Same”, which realises itself by 
appropriating them, the irreducibility of all Otherness must be 
recognised. This recognition supplants the overt or hidden monism of 
ontology by a pluralism whose basic ground model is the relation of 
the Same (le Même) and the Other (l’Autre) (1993: 19). 
 
The other is something I cannot grasp, possess or consume. It is “free from any theme 
and contests any meaning I ascribe to him” (Hughes, 1998: 85). As the other is 
“constituted as and by that which only escapes …we come to be involved with the other 
intimately as other, outside of any concept or thought of the other.” “The other is not 
part of my familiar world and does not share my home” (Hughes, 1998: 85). The other is 
an expression of infinity which escapes totalisation (Blum, 1983: 149).  Thus, “the Other 
presents itself as human Other (Autri); it shows a face and opens the (l’Autre) dimension 
of height, that is to say, it infinitely overflows the bounds of knowledge” (Peperzak et 
al., 1996: 12). 
 
The ‘I’ might see another as someone to realise certain wants or  ‘I’ might try to 
further its boundaries by taking the other under its sovereignty since “the I establishes 
itself by absorption of elements, things, and events or by submitting them to the I’s 
government” (Peperzak, 1993: 24). But such perceptions do not allow the other to reveal 
itself. Because “all aspects manifested by a phenomenological description that starts 
from these perspectives are immediately integrated by my self-centred, interested, and 
dominating consciousness” (Peperzak, 1993: 19), which can be called as a form of 
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egology. As Theodore De Boer (1997: 132) also puts it, “otherness can never be 
recognised via understanding or perception; it can be recognised only in the 
confrontation with the other, as an infinite responsibility, as an obligation resting on me 
or as an ‘obsession’ as Levinas says in psychoanalytic terminology.”  
 
Another central question on ‘the Same and the Other’ in  Levinas is as follows: 
“Can the Same welcome the Other, not by giving the Other to itself as a theme (that is to 
say, as being) but by putting itself in question?” (Peperzak et al., 1996: 16). For Levinas 
the irreducibility of the Other must be recognised since it is beyond my comprehension 
or knowledge. In this respect, Levinas’s endeavour can be described as “to protect the 
Other from the aggressions of the Same, to analyse the possibilities and conditions of its 
appearance in our lives and to formulate ethical significance of the encounter with it” 
(Davis, 1996: 3). But ‘protection of the Other from the aggressions of the Same’ does 
not mean privileging the Other before the Same which lead to invasion of the Same by 
the Other.  
 
If there are absolutely other beings then comprehension becomes a form of 
violence, because “the other transcends the limits of (self-) consciousness and its 
horizon; the look and the voice that surprise me are ‘too much’ for my capacity of 
assimilation” (Peperzak, 1993: 20). For Levinas, to preserve the Other as other it must 
not become an object of knowledge or experience, since the knowledge is my 
knowledge, and the experience is my experience. If you try to approach to Other by 
comprehension and knowledge, then you thematise it. However, the Other is not a 
concept or a design in mind. As Peperzak (1993: 21) puts it “the other does not permit 
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me to monopolise the world because the Other’s greatness does not fit into an enclosure 
- not even that of theoretical comprehension.” Trying to comprehend the other, to 
approach the other by comprehending it, will be by necessity to define it by our own 
words. As Levinas argues in Transcendence and Height:  
 
The other resists my attempt at investiture, not because of the extent 
and obscurity of the theme that it offers to my consideration but 
because of the refusal to enter into a theme, to submit to a regard, 
through the eminence of its epiphany (Peperzak et al.,1996 : 12). 
 
The other’s emergence disrupts “the closed circle of solitude by speaking to me, by 
calling my solitary existence into question”, and it brings “the separated bring out of 
egoist solitude and contentment.” (Hughes, 1998: 84-85). Peperzak explains this 
situation as follows: 
 
Another comes to the fore as other if and only if his or her 
‘appearance’ breaks, pierces, destroys the horizon of my egocentric 
monism, that is, when the other’s invasion of my world destroys the 
empire in which all phenomena are, from the outset, a priori, 
condemned to function as moments of my universe. The other’s face 
of the other’s speech interrupts and disturbs the order of my, ego’s 
world (1993: 19-20). 
 
For Levinas, “the manner in which the other (l’autre) presents himself, reaching beyond 
the idea I have of the other, we call … the face.” (1998: 50) In other words, “the other 
does not show it to the I as a theme. The epiphany of the Absolutely Other is a face by 
which the other challenges and commands me through his nakedness, through his 
destitution” (Peperzak et al., 1996: 17). Thus, the other is encountered as a face. 
Levinas’s first reference to face comes in the following passage in Totality and Infinity: 
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For the presence before the face, my orientation towards the Other 
can lose the avidity of the gaze only by turning into generosity, 
incapable of approaching the other with empty hands. This 
relationship, established over the things hereafter possibly common, 
that is, susceptible of being said is the relationship of discourse. The 
way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the 
other in me, we here name face (nous l’appelons, en effect, visage). 
(1998: 50) 
 
The face of the other, according to Avram (1996: 267), “is a mystery, a challenge, a 
threat, a teacher, and a subject of love – each in ways that refuse to be bound to 
knowing.” We do not mean a physical countenance or appearing by ‘the face of the 
other’. On the contrary, the other is “otherwise, irreducible to his appearing, and thus 
reveals himself precisely as face” (Burggraeve, 1999: 29). In Levinas’s account, “the 
primordial relationship to the other that one faces is ‘discourse’4. The non-totalising 
relationship to the face of the other is accomplished in a discourse, in a conversation 
which proposes the world” (cited in Robbins, 1991: 137).  
 
 
2.3 On Violence 
 
Regarding violence, Levinas’s philosophy can be considered as an effort “to give an 
analysis of human relations that preserves them from violence and totalitarianism” 
(Blum, 1983: 148). According to Levinas, “the other gives my freedom meaning because 
                                                 
4 Thus, discourse is a relationship with the other that maintains the distance of infinite separation “yet 
without this distance destroying this relation and without this relation destroying the distance. “ (Robbins, 
137). For more on ‘Discourse and Ethics’ please see Levinas (1998: 64-70, 72-77, 204-212). 
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I am confronted with real choices between responsibility and obligation towards the 
other or hatred and violent repudiation” (cited in Davis, 1996: 49). Levinas discovers in 
evil his concern, ‘the reduction of the other to the same’. Levinas places this at the 
centre of all violence. Blum argues that, 
 
the power and violence involved is that of reducing the "other" to 
the "same," Levinas' broadest expression for depriving individuals 
of their uniqueness in favor of their inclusion in a system of thought 
or the flow of history or some other kind of  ‘totality’ (1983: 148).  
  
Roger Burggaraeve (1999: 35) argues that “a first form of evil lies in considering the 
other as a potentiality or function of the establishment and affirmation of my ego, or I.” 
Therefore we can argue that ”my spontaneous, natural consideration of others is always 
self-interested and self-involved” (Burggraeve, 1999: 36). According to Burggraeve, this 
self-interestedness can go so far that 
 
the otherness of the other is no longer respected but, to speak with 
Kant, reduced to a mere means. Concretely, this happens whenever I 
try to make the other person subordinate to me as “food” or “power” 
or to press him into one or another form of service, hence to 
“consume” the other, to instrumentalise him and to use him (1999: 
36). 
 
 
This explanation on egocentrism and self-interested consideration shows us the source of 
all evil: the reduction of the other to the same. For Roland Paul Blum, the central 
concept in Levinas’s thought - reduction of the other to the same - takes two forms. He 
calls these forms as “solipsism” and “contextualism”.  Blum explains the solipsistic view 
in the following passage: 
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In the solipsistic view of totality the "other," that is, the "other per-
son" … is robbed of his individuality and his peculiarities by being 
understood or approached only on the self's own terms. The concepts 
involved, because they are the self’s, can never reveal the other 
person's essential otherness, the fact that he is not merely an aspect 
of the self, that he exists beyond the self's conceptual system. (1983: 
148) 
 
For Blum, the contextual view is as follows: 
 
In the interpretation of totality as contextual the emphasis is more on 
the fact that both the self and the other are seen as aspects of one 
total system of explanation. The most obvious example here is the 
thought of Hegel, though he is rarely mentioned by Levinas. A 
thinker constantly under attack is Heidegger who is accused of 
treating persons as merely occasions for the revelation of Being, 
thereby depriving them of any reality of their own.(1983: 148) 
 
 
While putting ‘the reduction of the other to the same’ at the centre of all evil, Levinas 
also distinguishes different forms in it. In this part, I will discuss two forms: 
‘Comprehension or the grasping of the consideration of the Other’, and ‘Passion of 
murder or the desire for the Other’5. 
 
 
2.3.1 Comprehension or the Grasping of the Consideration of the Other 
 
In Transcendence and Height, Levinas argues that “when the other enters into the 
horizon of my knowledge, it already renounces alterity” (Peperzak et al., 1996: 12). 
                                                 
5 This part draws extensively on Roger (1999). 
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Access to the other can be gained through “stripping him of his alterity via concepts, 
categories, and thematization” (Burggraeve, 1999: 36). Therefore, Burggraeve (1999:36) 
adds, “I can make images or photographs of the other person so that I suppose myself to 
know him.” I approach the other from my horizon and thematise (or describe) it by the 
words from my own vocabulary. By doing so, “the comprehending I, or ego, negates the 
irreducible uniqueness of the other and tries to conceive of him in the same way as he 
does the world” (Burggraeve, 1999: 36). 
 
 Thus, comprehensive knowledge becomes a violent phenomenon that makes I 
“gain not only access to the other” but also “power over him” by I’s “penetrating 
insight” (Burgrraeve, 1999: 36). This is because “knowledge is something acquired, 
dispensed, and instrumentally used by us. Consequently, knowledge of others 
necessarily reduces the other to something we possess, something we have acquired, and 
something we will use” (Gottlieb, 1996: 2), since nothing may remain out of it. Sean 
Hand argues that 
 
A Certain grasp: as an entity, being becomes the characteristic 
property of thought, as it is grasped by it and becomes known. 
Knowledge as perception, concept, comprehension, refers back to an 
act of grasping (1989: 76).  
 
At this point, the other becomes known which is “understood and so appropriated by 
knowledge” and “freed of its otherness” (Hand, 1989: 76). “Knowledge as perception” is 
also an “act of grasping” for Burggraeve because “the very perception of another person 
threatens to be violent, since it brings him under the synthetic power of the perceiver's 
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mind” (Blum, 1983: 148). All these, for Burggraeve, show how knowledge “brings evil 
for the other“ which he calls “the tragedy of human understanding” (1999: 32).  
 
 
  
2.3.2. Passion of Murder  
 
“Murder manifests itself not so much as a fact taking place once and for all, but as a 
passion driven by a well-determined intentionality - namely, to destroy the other 
totally”. (Burggraeve, 1999: 38). The following passage from Burggraeve explains 
murder in a Levinasian sense: 
 
Murder, then, renounces absolutely all comprehension of the other, 
for one no longer wishes to include the other in the same, that is, in 
one’s own project of existing, but, on the contrary, to exclude him, 
because he is too much in the way of one’s struggle for identity. 
Murder manifests itself as the effort and realization of an inexorable 
struggle for omnipotence: The I plays not “all or nothing” but “all 
and nothing”. It promotes itself to “all” so that the other must be 
reduced to nothing or no one (1999: 38). 
 
The other is the only one, which I wish to kill or to annihilate, since it is beyond my 
power. As Colin Davis (1996: 50) puts it, “the other resists my attempts at appropriation 
and domination; it escapes my power since I cannot possess or even understand it.” 
Thus, annihilation remains as the only way of suppressing the other: 
To kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce 
comprehension absolutely. Murder exercises a power over what 
escapes power. …I can wish to kill only an existent which is 
absolutely independent, which exceeds my powers infinitely, and 
therefore does not oppose them but paralyses the very power of 
power. The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill (1998: 198). 
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According to Colin Davis, “I may succeed in killing the other or even innumerable 
others,”6 because “murder is the most banal incident of human history” (1998: 198), as 
Levinas argues. But the Other survives; “the Other remains inviolate and inviolable. The 
face appears in my world, but does not belong to it; I can do it no harm” (Davis, 1996: 
51). “Violence, then, always ends or continues in failure. …Violence can only be a 
second or secondary response to the revelation that I cannot kill the Other.” (Davis, 
1996: 51) For Levinas, the original relation is peace.  
 
 
2.3.3 A Violence Typology 
 
There are two reasons to why I chose to employ the “Violence Typology” of Johan 
Galtung in a part dealing with violence in Levinas. The first reason is that Galtung has a 
broader understanding of violence. The second reason is that Galtung’s classification of 
violence into “direct” and “structural” violence is useful and brings a broader 
perspective in cooperation with two forms of violence in Levinas which I mentioned 
earlier.      
 
 According to Johan Galtung, forms of direct violence are instantly recognizable, 
but there are also hidden forms of violence. Galtung, in his work, proceeds from the 
following understanding of violence: 
 
I understand violence as the avoidable impairment of fundamental 
human needs or, to put it in more general terms, the impairment of 
                                                 
6 Here the distinction between “the other” and “the Other” becomes crucial.  
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human life, which lowers the actual degree to which someone is able 
to meet their needs below that which would otherwise be possible. 
The threat of violence is also violence. (Galtung, 1998: 168) 
 
 
This understanding of violence goes far beyond direct violence, in which one or more 
people inflict physical harm on other people. In addition to direct violence, Galtung 
(1990: 294) emphasizes another form of violence, namely structural violence, which is 
not carried out by individuals, but hidden to a greater or lesser extent in structures. An 
example of this might be the injustices of the worldwide system for the trade in goods, 
which creates more and more starving people every year. 
 
 
Need Groups  
Violence 
typology 
according to 
Galtung 
Survival 
(Negation: 
death) 
Well-being 
(Negation: 
poverty, 
illness) 
Identity / 
purpose 
(Negation: 
alienation) 
Freedom 
(Negation: 
oppression) 
Direct 
violence 
killing injury, siege, 
sanctions, 
poverty 
de-
socialization, 
re-socialization, 
underclass 
repression, 
imprisonment, 
expulsion, 
deportation 
Structural 
violence 
Exploitation A Exploitation B Penetration, 
segmentation 
Marginalization, 
fragmentation 
 
Figure 1 
 
Johan Galtung, Violence Typology 
 
During the 1990s, Galtung supplemented his violence typology with another category by 
introducing the concept of cultural violence: “Cultural violence should be understood as 
those aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimate the use of direct or 
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structural violence” (Galtung, 1990: 293). The Stars and Stripes, Hammer and Sickle, 
flags, hymns, military parades, portraits of the leader, inflammatory speeches and 
posters might be the examples for this category. 
 
 
2.4 The Ethical in Levinas7 
 
 “It may be that things allow themselves to be treated as elements subordinated to a 
global and hierarchical system, but do people not somehow resist this?” asks Peperzak 
(1993: 49) in his commentary on a Levinas’s chapter, The Primacy of the Same, or 
Narcissism. The answer to this question is worth thinking with respect to ethics in 
Levinas. 
 
 In Levinas, ethics is the first philosophy where ethics is described as the relation 
of infinite responsibility to the Other. It arises from the relation to the other because, 
 
the immediate experience of another’s emergence contains the root 
of all possible ethics as well as the source from which all insights of 
theoretical philosophy should start. The other’s existence as such 
reveals to me the basis and the primacy sense of my obligations 
(Peperzak, 1993: 22).  
 
It is the first philosophy since, it disrupts ontology and logocentrism. In other words it is 
the relation to the other which is ethical, “not an ethics that is instantiated in relations” 
(Critchley and Bernasconi, 2002: 12). In his words, Levinas (1998: 143) defines ethics 
                                                 
7 For another application of Levinas’s thoughts, especially his ethics to International Relations, please see 
David Campbell (1994) and David Campbell and Michael Dillon (1993). 
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as “putting into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other.” Here, his 
purpose is “to show the way in which any person other than myself, although 
metaphysically independent of me and I of him, has an absolute moral claim on me” 
(Blum, 1983: 147). At this point, let us refer to Levinas’s most quoted passage on ethics: 
 
A calling into question of the same- which cannot occur within the 
egoist spontaneity of the same- is brought about by the other. We 
name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of 
the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility  to 
the :I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished 
as calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, 
transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other 
by me, is concretely produced as the calling into question of the 
same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical 
essence of knowledge. And as critique precedes dogmatism, 
metaphysics precedes ontology (1998: 43). 
  
 Thus, one can say that Ethics is also critique for Levinas;  
 
it is the critical mise en question of the liberty, spontaneity, and 
cognitive emprise of the ego that seeks to reduce all otherness itself. 
The ethical is therefore at location of a point of alterity; or what 
Levinas also calls ‘exteriority’, that cannot be reduced to the Same” 
(Critchley, 1999: 5).  
 
To put it another way, “ethics takes place as the putting into question of the ego, the self, 
consciousness or what he calls, in the term he borrows from Plato, the same” (Critchley 
and Bernasconi, 2002: 15). Therefore, the same is called into question by the Other 
“who escapes the logic of sameness and domination” (Levene, 2004: 47). This putting 
into question of the self, argues Levinas, “is precisely a welcome to absolutely other” 
(Peperzak et al., 1996: 17), since it is possible due to the other’s strangeness and 
irreducibility to the I. In addition, “putting into question is a new tension within the I. 
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Instead of annihilating the I, putting into question binds it to the other in an 
incomparable and unique way.” (Peperzak, et al., 1996: 17) 
 
 “Traditionally, philosophy gives priority to knowing comprehension and treats 
ethics as derivative” (Avram, 1996: 265). But for Levinas, “knowledge cannot be the 
basis of ethical life - that is, of transcending concern for the other people, a concern 
untouched by our own needs, desires and attempts to control” (Gottlieb, 1996: 2). Thus, 
Levinas’s ethics introduces “a forgotten possibility into this traditional philosophical 
hierarchy … in which none of the three (self, other, world) cannot be reduced to either of 
the others” (Avram, 1996: 265). By doing this Levinas “challenges the power with which 
philosophical comprehension has underwritten the intellectual enterprise of Western 
culture by drawing all forms of theory and practice into its thematic gaze” (Avram, 1996: 
265).  
 
We can see this ethical understanding in Levinas’s two major books, Totality and 
Infinity, and Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence which “are devoted to showing 
how phenomenology discloses an ethical alternative to what he variously calls Western 
philosophy, ontology, thematization, conceptualisation, theory, universality, interiority, 
and correlation - in short, totality” (Levene, 2004: 46). Thus, the central task of Levinas’s 
work can be defined as “the attempt to describe a relation with the other person that 
cannot be reduced to comprehension” (Critchley and Bernasconi, 2002:  8). “Levinas 
seeks to overcome the fundamental rationalist, egocentric presuppositions of Western 
philosophical ethics” (Gottlieb, 1996:1). The important point about his ethics is that it is 
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“potentially disruptive of thought, for thought fails when it stretches for concepts and 
metaphors by which it might comprehend the irreducibly Other” (Avram, 1996, 270).   
 
Indeed, ethics may not be regarded as the correct term for the philosophy of  
Levinas; the term ethical might be more suitable, or what Derrida calls “ethics of ethics”. 
Because, “the ethical is the broader domain where ethical experiences and relationships 
occur before the foundations of ethics in the sense of philosophically established 
principles, rules or codes” (Davis, 1996: 48).  
 
 The ethical relation in Levinas revolves around the encounter between the Same 
and the Other. But “this encounter cannot be explained in exclusively ontological terms 
because it involves more than Being” (Davis, 1996: 48). In other words, 
 
This encounter is, Levinas insists, ethical; and the ethical bond with 
the Other is the most fundamental subject for philosophical reflection 
because there is nothing that precedes it or has priority over it. It 
characterizes human relations at their most basic level (Davis, 1996: 
48). 
 
Levinas argues that this ethical relation to the other is “ultimately prior to his ontological 
relation to himself (egology)”, or “to the totality of things which we call the world 
(cosmology)” (Kearney, 1984: 57). “Our engagements with the other are always 
concrete – embodied and emplaced – but in a relationship that is prior to any 
significance that might be attached to it by philosophy, culture, politics or place” 
(Popke, 2003: 304).  Thus, ethics is the first philosophy, as Levinas calls it, which is 
prior to any mediation or philosophy. In other words, ethics is otherwise than knowledge 
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or comprehension. Because, encounter is the moment when the self realizes and 
practices that he has no longer the power with him and also the encounter is an unusual 
occasion for the consciousness (Şenyurt, 2003: 1). The reason for this is the 
“fundamental difference in the way we apprehend a particular object, within the horizon 
of being and the way we approach the other” (Smith, 2003: 19). 
 
Before the encounter, we are instrumental egoists whose relationship to the world 
is characterized primarily by enjoyment. So, the significance of the encounter is that “the 
other puts me into question by revealing to me that my powers and freedom are limited.” 
(Davis, 1996: 49) Davis continues so as to make it clearer (1996: 49): “The 
transcendental Ego would like to be the sole source of its own knowledge, actions and 
meanings; the encounter with the Other shows such freedom to be egoistical, arbitrary 
and unjustified.” “Thus the (ethical) encounter with the other interrupts the self’s 
habitual economy and its tendency to conceive of the world as a space of possibilities 
and power (pouvoir)” (Robbins, 1991: 137). The encounter with the other lies at the 
origin of the separateness of the self; only by discovering the irreducibility of the alterity 
of the other. The other makes me realise that I share the world that is not my unique 
possession. For Levinas, “my ethical relation for the other stems from the fact that the 
self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-the-
world, within the ontology” (Kearney, 1984: 60). 
 
 “The ethical relation to the other is described by Levinas in terms of infinity” 
(Critchley and Bernasconi, 2002: 14). Levinas’s idea of infinity has three sources: the 
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Bible, Plato and Descartes. For these sources let us refer to several passages from 
Blum’s article (1983: 149-150): 
 
From the Old Testament prophets Levinas takes the idea of the 
eschatological vision of a meaning or end to history that lies beyond 
history. Ultimately, though Levinas does not make the point, 
"infinity" can be seen as Jahweh, existing beyond history and beyond 
human conceptualisations, yet giving direction to human existence. 
 
Levinas' second example of "infinity" is Plato's theory, in the Repub-
lic, that the Good is beyond Being. The forms are ta onta, those 
which are, but in looking "beyond being" Levinas seeks, "not (that 
which) is in another way, but (that which) is other than Being." 
 
Levinas appeals to Descartes' analysis of the idea of infinity in the 
Third Meditation. For Descartes, Levinas asserts, "The idea of 
the infinite is exceptional in that its ideatum lies beyond its idea, 
whereas for objects, the total coincidence of their 'objective' and 
'formal' realities is not excluded. For all ideas other than that of 
the infinite we could, ultimately, be solely responsible."  
 
In Descartes Levinas finds the epistemological keynote to his 
entire theory. Descartes entertains the possibility that thought 
determines its entire content. In thinking infinity, however, as 
Levinas says, "We think more than is thought. This “more than” 
is transcendence, that which lies beyond any structure or 
“totality.” “In the idea of the infinite one thinks that which 
always remains external to thought.”  
 
 
For Levinas, ethics arise first and foremost out of our fundamental responsibility 
for the other. “The other’s facing me makes me responsible for him/her, and this 
responsibility has no limits.” (Peperzak, 1993: 22) This responsibility in the first place is 
“taking care not to violate or destroy the other in his otherness, which is to say not to 
reduce the other to his countenance, but instead to recognize, respect, and do justice to him 
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in his otherness.” According to Levinas, “this responsibility arises because there is a 
certain form of violence involved in taking place of being” (cited in Popke, 2003: 304). 
As Levinas puts it: 
 
My being-in-the-world or ‘my place in the sun’, my being at home, 
have these not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the 
other whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a 
third world; are these not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, 
stripping, killing? (Hand, 1989: 82) 
 
 
As Hand (1989: 85) argues, “my presence before the face is therefore an epiphany. It 
creates an asymmetrical indebtedness on my part towards the other’s moral summons 
which is based not on a prior knowledge … but on the primacy of the other’s right to 
exist.” For Levinas, “in ethics, the other’s right to exist has primacy over my own.” 
(Kearney, 1984: 60) 
 
 The ethical relation to the other precedes the egoism and tyranny of ontology. 
Colin Davis (1996: 50) argues that “when the face erupts into our world, its first 
expression is a commandment: ‘You shall not kill” which is taken by Levinas as the first 
and the most fundamental of laws and, from which all others derive.” This is because  
 
the ethical exigency to be responsible for the other undermines the 
ontological primacy of the meaning of the Being; it unsettles the 
natural and political positions we have taken up in the world and 
predisposes us to a meaning that is other than Being, that is 
otherwise than Being. (Kearney,  1984: 59).  
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Therefore, “ethics is against nature because it forbids the murderousness of my natural 
will to put my own existence first” (Kearney, 1984: 60). Levinas’s subversion of nature 
and ontology can be found in his statements: ‘responsibility precedes essence’ and ‘the 
good transcends essence’. 
 
 For Levinas, the ethical relation is fundamentally asymmetrical and non-
reciprocal, since the other does not share my powers and responsibilities. According to 
Levinas, “it would be a mistake for me to respect the other because I expect anything in 
return; my obligation and responsibility are not mirrored by the other’s reciprocal 
responsibility towards me” (cited in Davis, 1996: 51-52).    
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CHAPTER 3 
VIOLENCE OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY 
 
 
In this chapter, I will show how the democratic peace theory is violent in itself – this, in 
spite of how it argues for a peaceful world through the spread of democracy. In order to 
do this, I will explore the egocentric and violent tendencies that can be claimed to exist 
within the democratic peace theory by referring to Levinas’s philosophical insights on 
these issues. 
 
 
 As a modernist theory, democratic peace theory cannot be considered separately 
from the philosophical tradition in which it is rooted. This philosophical tradition has 
been characterised by the primacy of the self, the same, the subject or being. In other 
words, the philosophical tradition from Plato to Husserlian phenomenology or 
Heideggerian ontology has been “a philosophy of the same and that its aspiration rests in 
a fundamental narcissism of an ego which takes itself to be the centre and the all.” As 
Blum (1983: 148) puts it, “violence and totalitarianism have found their philosophical 
justification in this philosophical tradition dominated by the concept of totality.” As 
David Campbell, while mentioning on the holocaust, also argues that “there is no 
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escaping the recognition that modern political life lies heavily implicated in the 
instigation and conduct of this horror” (in Campbell and Dillon, 1993: 164). 
 
 
3.1 Egocentrism and Democratic Peace Theory: Identifying the West by 
Democracy 
 
 
By constituting itself as the Ego (Being, the same), the West becomes the source of all 
meaning or, as Derrida argues, the cape or headland for all civilisations. This can be 
called as the question of exemplarity. Since the end of the Cold War, as Fukuyama 
declared the end of the history and the triumph of Western liberalism, this exemplarity 
has been defined more and more with reference to democracy. In other words, the West 
as the Being identified itself with democracy.      
 
 As I mentioned earlier, democratic peace theory is rooted in the Western 
philosophical tradition and, in consequence, is therefore also characterised by the 
primacy of the self.  In democratic peace theory, there exists a fundamental narcissism 
of ego, which takes itself to be the centre of all meaning. In other words, the dominant 
political system of West, namely democracy becomes an ideal for all other states. 
Although Fukuyama is not regarded a representative of democratic peace theory, his 
ideas on “the end of the history” and “the triumph of Western liberalism” had a 
considerable effect on serving the democracy as an ideal for all other nations after the 
Cold War.  Therefore, at this point, let us refer to Fukuyama’s argument related to this 
issue. Fukuyama, in his famous article the End of the History, he argues that 
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What we may be witnessing in not just the end of the Cold War, or 
the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of 
history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological 
evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as 
the final form of human government (1989: 2). 
 
Fukuyama’s intention here can be considered as follows: Liberal democracy is the most 
satisfying form of government and it presents the final stage of human government. All 
other ideologies will fall in its wake. Therefore, all other states which are not liberal 
must move towards being liberal democracies to justify their rules. 
 
 Here, we see that the same is not questioned, whereas the otherness or the alterity 
of the other is seen as temporary only – that is, as something “which can be eliminated 
as it is incorporated into or reduced to the sameness” (Davis, 1996: 3). In other words, 
the alterity of the other state is temporary since it is considered to be on the way to 
becoming the same: liberal and democratic. To put it in yet another way, the other is 
considered as “a potentiality or function of the establishment and affirmation of ego, or 
I” (Burggraeve, 1999: 35); the affirmation as liberal, democratic and peaceful.  
 
 
3.2 Democracy and Violence 
 
Democracies perceive themselves as inherently peaceful and “peace-loving, stressing the 
peaceful pursuit of their goal” (Galtung, 1996: 49). Recent history displays the examples 
of wars engaged by democratic states like the USA, France, the UK and Israel. An 
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example in the last decade is the US-led coalition in both the First and the Second Gulf 
War. These cases show that, as Galtung (1996: 50) concludes, “democracy is compatible 
with large-scale exercises of violence.” Thus, the use of force by democracies is justified 
because “they are directed against real threat launched by rogue actors intent on 
undermining the ‘democratic way of life’” (Grayson, 2003: 3). 
 
 This part of the chapter deals with both the violence inside the democratic peace 
theory and the violence which exists in the acts informed by this theory. In more specific 
terms, the violence at the theoretical level is dealt with in the terms of comprehension 
while the violence in practice is dealt within terms of murder   
 
 
3.2.1 Comprehension 
 
The main concern under this title is the expansion of self-interest through identification 
of the other, which represents a hidden monism inside democratic peace theory. This 
hidden monism, which exists in democratic peace theory, proposes the enlargement of 
the identity of the West through the reduction of the other8. In order to bring a different 
perspective to “the enlargement through reduction”, let us quote a passage from 
Yasemin Şenyurt: 
 
                                                 
8 While making such an argument we should bear in mind that democratic peace theory was born in the 
West, drawing on the ideas of German philosopher Immanuel Kant, and introduced to International 
Relations literature by the Western scholars. 
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Man, who wants to take the nature and himself under his control, 
wants to further extend his boundaries by taking the other under his 
sovereignty. …Hence, the man who sucks in all objects like a 
hurricane, also perceives the other as an object and wants to inhale it 
like a cigarette, to throw away its butt and then step on it. In other 
words, he wants to put his intelligent imprint on everything in life. 
(2003: 1) 
 
 The intelligent imprint, here, is comprehension, and it is therefore comprehensive 
knowledge which brings reduction. To put it in a different way comprehension (of the 
other state) constitutes the power of the West in this respect.  
 
The other is beyond the knowledge or the power of the West, it comes from a 
dimension that surpasses the West. It is “free from any theme and contests any meaning” 
(Hughes, 1998: 85) that the West ascribes to it. To access the other, the West resorts to 
stripping the other of its alterity via concepts, categories and thematization. According to 
Levinas (1998: 47),”thematization and conceptualisation, which moreover are 
inseparable, are not peace with the other but suppression or possession of the other.”  
 
In democratic peace theory, thematization is realised in calling the other state as 
non-democratic which reflects the vocabulary and, therefore, also the consciousness of 
the self. At this point we can argue that “when the other enters into the horizon of my 
knowledge it already renounces alterity” (Peperzak et al., 1996: 12). By calling the other 
state as non-democratic, the West disrupts the alterity of the other. Here, the West 
constitutes the comprehending I, or the ego which negates the irreducible uniqueness of 
the other and tries to conceive it in the same way as it does the world. Thus, all the 
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alternative futures for the other state have been destroyed, and democracy has been left 
as the only true option.    
 
 The West thematises the other because it wants to bring the other to its domain of 
consciousness (comprehension) and, therefore, to become able to dominate the other. As 
I mentioned earlier, comprehension is the power of the West in this respect. 
Comprehensive knowledge becomes a violent phenomenon that makes I gain not only 
access to the other, but also power over him. Because the knowledge is “something 
acquired, dispensed, and instrumentally used by us” (Gottlieb, 1996: 2). Consequently, 
knowledge of others necessarily reduces the other to something we possess, something 
we have acquired, and something we will use, since nothing may remain out of it. So, 
the West’s attempt to comprehend the other can be evaluated around the statement of 
“leaving nothing out of it”. By its exemplary mission, the West regards the world as its 
material and intellectual possession and, therefore, nothing should remain external to it. 
Thus, the other state should be reduced to a knowable object to stay within the West’s 
domain of grasp. The non-democratic state is the other which has become known, 
understood and thus appropriated by knowledge and freed of its otherness. It becomes a 
knowable object that can be suppressed. This violent act finds its justification in the 
Western philosophical tradition, which is dominated by the comprehension of being or 
the suppression of the other with reference to the primacy of the same.  
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3.2.2 Murder 
 
As Burggraeve (1999: 38) puts it, “murder manifests itself not so much as a fact taking 
place once and for all, but as a passion driven by a well-determined intentionality- 
namely, to destroy the other totally.” Thus, murder does not propose the reduction of the 
other to the same but to nothing. In this section, I will deal with the spread of democracy 
– act informed by the democratic peace theory – as the reduction of the other to the same 
which can be then followed by murder, annihilation, since the other may resist the 
attempts at appropriation and domination.   
 
Democratic peace theory regards the spread of democracy as the basis of world 
peace, since it claims that democratic states are more peaceful than states having any 
other type of regime. Instead of serving a peaceful end, the spread of democracy carries 
an implicit (or explicit) violent phenomenon: reduction of the other. Then spread of 
democracy becomes a tool of assimilation, by democratising other states – the non-
democratic states - to the same, to being, ego, or to itself. In other words, the West 
creates alter egos (alter Wests) through the spread of democracy. The way of doing this 
is to reduce it to something like me. At this point we can argue that the to reason why 
democratic states have positive images of each other, the reason to why democratic 
states “expect decision-makers in other states likewise to follow the same norms of 
conflict resolution as have been developed within and characterize those other states' 
domestic political processes”, or the reason to why democratic peace theorists 
perceive the relations between the democracies as peaceful due to their certainty about 
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each other’s intentions can be found in the West’s reduction of the other(state) to 
something like itself. 
 
As Colin Davis (1996: 50) puts it, “the other resists my attempts at appropriation 
and domination; it escapes my power since I cannot possess or even understand it.” 
Thus, annihilation or murder remains as the only way of suppressing the other. Murder 
is “to exclude [the other], because he is too much in the way of one’s struggle for 
identity” (Burggraeve, 1999: 38). In the murder, “the I plays not ‘all or nothing’ but ‘all 
and nothing’” (Burggraeve, 1999: 38). The other is the only one, which I wish to kill or 
to annihilate since it is beyond my power. This is also driven by another factor which 
Levinas calls “desire”. The emergence of the other answers the deepest desire 
motivating me. This desire is different from all forms of human need. The self desires 
the absolute and the infinite that does not fit into comprehension. This desire motivates 
the self to consume, to suppress the other, and to take it under his control. This desire 
motivates the West’s enlargement through identification of the other. 
 
  Reduction of the other to the same or the spread of democracy to non-democratic 
state can be considered a form structural or indirect violence (see Galtung’s violent 
typology on page 31). It is structural violence, because it is hidden in the structure; in the 
current make up of the international system, which is a modernist one based on the 
Western philosophical tradition which has been one of the main targets of this work. 
This indirect or structural violence can easily convert into direct violence accompanied 
by the wish not to include the other in the same anymore. The acts of the Western states 
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like the invasion of Iraq by the US and allied forces in the name of spreading the 
democracy can be an example.   
 
 The West may succeed in killing the other since “murder is the most banal 
incident of human history” (1998:198), as Levinas argues. However, the Other survives; 
“the Other remains inviolate and inviolable. The face appears in my world but does not 
belong to it; I can do it no harm” (Daivs, 1996: 51). Violence, then, always ends or 
continues in failure. …Violence can only be a second or secondary response to the 
revelation that I cannot kill the Other” (Davis, 1996: 51). For Levinas, the original 
relation is peace.  
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A CONCLUSION TOWARDS ETHICAL PEACE 
 
 
How can Being justify itself? What is there other than Being? What may remain other to 
knowledge? What is there beyond my power? These are the questions, which are very 
central to Levinas’s thought, are also employed as the central questions directing the 
main theme of this thesis. However, the difficulty underlying the employment of such 
questions in a work comprising interstate relations is that there is a need to project those 
questions onto states, and that always involves the danger of producing misleading 
answers and misleading interpretation of the philosophical thought. Therefore, I tried to 
start from the most basic one; the modern man, since the democratic peace theory is a 
modernist theory9. By doing this, I described a West that persists its being as sovereign, 
and is concerned to maintain the powers of its sovereignty by the enlargement of its 
identity through the reduction of the other. 
 
 Indeed, such a description of the West exists in democratic peace theory. In 
democratic peace theory, the West is described as self-interested which tries to expand 
through identification of the other, and which represents a hidden monism inside the 
theory. Therefore the modern state in the West - just like the modern man - is motivated 
by a deep desire to further its boundaries by taking the other under its control. The West 
                                                 
9 In the thesis, I project the peculiarities of the modern man onto the modern state. 
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as Being, as the ego, as the centre of all meaning and civilisation wants nothing to 
remain external to it or external to its knowledge. At this point, for the purpose of 
deepening the case, we should again refer to the characteristics of the modern man. The 
modern man believes that he can solve everything through his mind and, therefore, 
“downgrades and insults everything primarily his own body and also all of the other 
living creatures and other objects in the world” (Şenyurt, 2003: 1). In such a world, in 
which the self comprehends all the objects and living creatures, there is no surprise. 
Thus, as long as the West is not interrupted by the emergence of another, the other state 
which is external to its consciousness, the West continues to enjoy its supremacy both 
intellectually and materially.   
 
 Therefore, my first point of criticism was about the egocentrism which exists 
within the democratic peace theory. By declaring democracy as the best political system 
which is characterised by freedom and peace, the West attempts to consolidate its central 
position as the intellectual master of the world. In this respect, the other state is 
considered to be in a move towards being a democracy and thus comprehended in this 
way. In other words, the other state becomes a tool for affirmation of the ego when 
comprehended.     
 
 By arguing all these, we come to such a point that we establish a correlation 
between democracy and violence in today’s international system. Democracies perceive 
themselves as peaceful and pacific, and justify their violent actions by calling them 
something different than conflict. This peaceful perception of each other among the 
democracies give way to the idea of spreading democracy and, thus, making the world 
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peaceful. Can this really be achieved? If democracy was the basis of peace, then why 
could we not eliminate the violence inside democracies and inside their acts? Here we 
face with the idea of the other, the other state which is beyond the knowledge or the 
power of the West, and which comes from a dimension that surpasses the West. It is 
“free from any theme and contests any meaning” (Hughes, 1998: 85) that the West 
ascribes to it. Therefore, the other emerges with the possibility of peace and ethics in the 
world. This is because the emergence of another puts me into question, due to his or her 
strangeness and irreducibility. But against this picture, the West resorts to stripping the 
other of its alterity via concepts, categories and thematization. This thematization is 
realised in calling the other state as non-democratic, which reflects the vocabulary and, 
therefore, also the consciousness of the self. This shows the violence within democratic 
peace theory since the other state is robbed of its peculiarities, its alterity is destroyed 
and it becomes a property of the though of the West through the thematization and 
conceptualisation.  
 
The desire for the absolute and the infinite other is followed by a passion to 
destroy the other totally, as when the West does not want the inclusion of the other in the 
same. Prior to the passion of murder, the West attempts to reduce the other state through 
the spread of democracy. By doing this, it reduces the other state to something like itself 
and therefore can be sure about its peaceful intentions. To repeat an argument from the 
third chapter here again: we can argue that the reason to why democratic states have 
positive images of each other, the reason to why democratic states “expect decision-
makers in other states likewise to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as 
have been developed within and characterize those other states' domestic political 
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processes”, or the reason to why democratic peace theorists perceive the relations 
between the democracies as peaceful due to their certainty about each other’s 
intentions can be found in the West’s reduction of the other(state) to something like 
itself. 
 
 As the other is resistant to my attempts at appropriation and domination, the 
murder remains as the last option for the West to suppress the other. But again, the West 
realises that it cannot kill the Other; violence fails in all attempts to kill the Other. The 
West can kill the other, this is a usual occasion since it has practised killing for 
centuries. As Levinas argues, the original relationship to the other is peace. 
 
 Consequently, I want to move onto a different discussion before concluding the 
thesis. The encounter with the other constitutes the very basis of ethical relationship to 
the other. This encounter puts me in question. In other words, it makes me realise that 
this world is not my unique possession, and both my power and freedom is limited. Can 
such an ethical understanding as the first philosophy be the basis of the world peace? 
Can the states see their existence as for-the-other? When states do not make the other as 
a knowable object, when they respect the otherness of the other, and when they respect 
another which is external to their thought, then the way to ethical peace in the 
international relations is opened up. Another important point here is that states should be 
aware of the fact that their separate existence is possible only with the existence of the 
other, the other state which is not reduced. All these bring respect for the differences, but 
not a respect monitored and supervised by a superior ego. If there is to exist such an 
ethical relationship, it should be the first philosophy for all states which is prior to all 
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law and rules. In such an international environment, I am always reminded by the Other 
that my freedom and powers are limited then this fundamental ethical relation leads to 
peace and a respectful international system. 
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